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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. COLMAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA A. 
BUTKOVICH, husband and wife; G. 
W. ANDERSON and JEANNE D. 
BANKS, and all unknown persons who 
claim any interest in the subject mat-
ter of this action, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No, 
13868 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued to quiet title to a parcel of property 
located in Park City, Utah, claiming ownership and ad-
verse possession. The defendants Butkovich answered 
claiming title and possession superior to plaintiff's to all 
but a small part of the property claimed by plaintiff. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After -trial the lower count entered a decree quieting 
title to the property in plaintiff based on a finding that 
an affidavit gave plaintiff color of title. The lower court 
denied a motion to amend the findings of fact and con-
elusions of law and to alter the judgment filed by defen-
dants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the decree quieting title in 
plaintiff reversed and! to have a decree entered quieting 
title in defendants covering the property claimed by de-
fendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants Butkovioh obtained their title to the 
property by two quit-claim deeds from Summit County 
on July 9, 1964, and April 15, 1965. Summit County had 
previously, in 1915 and 1940, obtained title by Auditor's 
Tax Deeds resulting from tax sales in 1910 and 1935. The 
second deed from the Courity was given to correct a slight 
error in the description on the first deed (R. 62). 
The Butkoviches thereafter requested Security Title 
Company to issue title insurance to them on this prop-
erty. Security Title Company first had Butkoviches con-
vey the property to Security Title Company, using a 
metes and bounds description, and Security Title Com-
pany reconveyed the property to Butkoviches using the 
same description. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
The plaintiff claims his title through a deed to him 
from Robert T. Banks dated November 12, 1968. There 
is no conveyance of any kind to Robert T. Banks. How-
ever, Banks signed an affidavit asserting that he was 
trustee of the Assets Corporation which "became the 
majority owner" of the assets of Park City Townsite 
Company. 
The history of the property involved in this action 
is contained in the abstract of title introduced in evidence 
as Exhibit No. 11. Since the entries in this abstract ame 
not in chronological order, summaries of the chain of title 
were prepared and introduced into evidence as Exhibits 
11A and 11B. Because of the numerous defects in the 
title claimed by Colman, these exhibits are set forth in 
full. In explanation of the exhibits, the legal description 
used in each conveyance is underlined and appears just 
ahead of the conveyances using that description and the 
numbers in parentheses indicate the page in the abstract 
where each conveyance is found. 
EXHIBIT NO. 11A 
According to Abstract of Title No. B-26963 
Prepared by Western States Title 
Insurance Company 
NW y4 SE % § 16, T2S, R4E, SLB & M 
United States of America 
i 
(1) Frederick A. Nims Patent 2/26/77 
(3) Edward P. Ferry Quit Claim Deed 1/13/80 
j Those Parts of the NW % SE V4 § 16, T2S, R4E, 
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not subdivided into lots and blocks and lying 
Southwest of Norfolk Avenue in Park City. 
(6) David C. McLaughlin Warranty Deed 2/8/83 
NW y4 of SE y4 § 16, T2S, R4E, SLM; also all 
of the unplatted land lying and being in the 
above mentioned legal subdivisions of land. 
(44) Oliver C. Lockhart, Trustee Decree 8/19/14 
Beneficiaries: 
Edward P. Ferry 2/5 
Amanda H. F. Hall 1/5 of 2/5 
Hannah E. Jones 1/5 of 2/5 
Heirs of Mary L. F. Eaistman 1/5 of 2/5 
Edward P. Ferry 1/5 of 2/5 
Frederick A. Nims ) 
and David D. Erwin J * ' 5 
No conveyance horn Oliver C. Lockhart 
An undivided one-half of all the right, title, and 
interest of said Edward P. Ferry, of, in and to 
the Park City Townsite, situated in Summit, 
State of Utah. 
William Montague Ferry, guardian of person 
and estate of Edward P. Ferry, a mentally in-
competent person. 
(10) The Michigan Trust Company 
Deed 12/26/13 
All its right, title and interest in and for the Park 
City Townsite, situated in Summit County, State 
of Utah. 
(19) The Assets Corporation Deed 12/28/16 
No conveyance from the Assets Corporation 
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All the unplatted land and the unoccupied and 
unused land lying and being in the NE xk of the 
NE V4 of Section 21, and the NW % of the SE 
% and the E V2 of SE % of Section 16, Town-
ship 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
(23) McCormick & Co., Bankers 
Decree of Foreclosure 
3/20/16 Rec. 9/16/49 
v. 
W. I. Snyder, as Trustee 
(12) No buyer named (No sale stated) 
Sheriff's Certificate of 
Sale 5/23/16 
(14) Park City Townsite Company 
Assignment of Certificate 
of Sale 11/21/16 
NW y4 of SE y2 of § 16, T2S, R4E, SLM 
(16) Park City Townsite Company 
Sheriff's Deed 11/21/16 
No conveyance from P&rk City Townsite Com-
pany t 
The remaining assets of said Assets Corporation 
(38) Robert T. Banks By own affidavit 11/12/68 
"Assets Corporation became the majority owner 
of all the property and assets of said Park City 
Townsite Company except a small holding of 
W. J. Snyder/' 
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All that part of the NW Y4 of the SE % of § 
16, T2S, R4E, SLM that lies Westerly of Nor-
folk Avenue. 
Robert T. Banks, as Trustee and individually 
(36) William J. Colman Warranty Deed 11/12/68 
EXHIBIT NO. 11B 
Chain of Title 
According to Abstract of Title No. B-26963 
Prepared by Western States 
Title Insurance Company 
Lots 21 to 32, inclusive, Block 29, Park City, also 
16 Lots in rear of Block 29. 
D. C. McLaughlin Estate 
(43) Summit County Tax Sale 12/19/10 
(47) Auditors Tax Deed 6/11/15 
All of unplatted land in Block 29, and 
all land West of Block 29, and part 
of Lot 1; part of Lot "A"; Park City 
(49) Summit County Treasurer 
1 (P&rk City Townsite Co.) 
Summit County Tax Sale 12/21/35 
Marginal Auditors 
Tax Deed 5/25/40 
(50) A. J. Butkovich and Geneva A. 
Butkovich Quit Claim Deed 7/9/64 
(58) Correction Deed Quit Claim Deed 4/15/65 
J Lots 21 to 32 inclusive, Block 29, and 16 Lots in 
i the rear of Block 29, all unplatted land in Block 
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I 29, and all land West of Block 29 and lots 1 and 
A, Park City Survey. Metes and Bounds de-
scription described to-wit: 
BEGINNING at a point which is the S.W. cor-
ner of the N.W. lA of the S.E. xk of Section 16, 
T2S, R4E, SLB & M., and running thence East-
erly along % lA Section line a distance of 1200.0 
feet, more or less to a point on the West Line of 
Lot 2, Block 29, Park City Survey and running 
thence N. 23°38' W. 410 feat; thence S. 66°57' W. 
75 feet; thence, N. 23°38' W. 455 feet to a point 
on the North l ine of Block 28, Park City Sur-
vey; thence No. 66° 57' E. 75 feet; thence N. 
23°38/ W. 79.3 feet to a point on the N.W. cor-
ner of Lot 2, Block 27, Park City Survey; thence 
S. 66°57' W. 75 feet; thence No. 23°38' W. 50 
feet; thence N. 66°57' E. 75 feet to a point on 
the N.W. corner of Lot 4, Block 27, Park City 
Survey; thence 23°38' W. 225 feet to a point on 
the N.W. corner of Lot 13, Block 27, Ptok City 
Survey; thence S. 66°57' W. 75 feet; thence N. 
23°38' W. 55 feet; thence S. 66°57' W. 75 feet, 
thence N. 23°38' W. 50 feet, to a point on the 
North property line of First Street (line ex-
tended) thence along said North line (extended) 
N. 66°57' E. 75 feet to a point on the S.W. corner 
of Lot 9, Block 26, Park City Survey; thence N. 
23°38' W. 144.8 feet to a point on the % Section 
line of said Section 16; thence West along said % 
line 490.0 feet to the center of said Section 16; 
thence S. along the lA line a distance of 1320.0 
feet more or less to the point of beginning. 
T 
(31) Security Title Company 
k Warranty Deed 2/23/66 
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(33) A. J. Butkovich and 
Geneva A. Butkovich 
Quit Claim Deed 2/23/66 
It should be pointed out that the order in which con-
veyance (19) appears above has been changed from that 
on Exhibit No. 11A to further clarify the chain of title. 
Contrary to the assertions of Banks in his affidavit 
(page 38 of Exhibit No. 11) that the corporation was 
winding up and that he was named as trustee to dispose 
of the assets, no assets of the Assets Corporation were 
transferred to Banks and the corporation was not wind-
ing-up. Instead, the minutes of the directors' meeting on 
the date referred to in the affidavit (Exhibit No. 13) 
show that the secretary was instructed to reinstate the 
company in good standing, the president was authorized 
to negotiate a loan from the bank. Further^ the corpora-
tion continued to exist, was conveying property, redeem-
ing taxes, selling patented mining claims, all as a corpora-
tion, and depositing the proceeds of sales in a corporate 
bank account, in 1940, 1944 and 1961 (Exhibits No. 14 
& No. 15). 
Moreover, Banks wrote a letter on September 20, 
1968, giving instructiions on how to establish title to 
this property which he knew he didn't have. This letter 
was introduced as Exhibit No. 16 and is set forth in full 
under Pbint I of the Argument section of this brief. 
Alter Butkovich received his deed to the property 
in 1964, he took a bulldozer on the property and blocked 
off entrances, drove in stakes and tied ribbons on trees 
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to mark the boundaries and put up "no trespassing" signs. 
He also cleared brush off the ground and leased the prop-
erty to United Park City Mines Company for use as a 
ski run (R. 62-63, Exh. 20). 
After Coiman received his deed in 1968 he also claims 
to have posted "no trespassing" signs on the property 
and to have chased off Christmas tree cutters (R. 10). 
Beyond that he has taken no action with respect to the 
property that would show any ownership (R. 15). At 
the trial his attorneys admitted that he did not have 
possession of the property "within the meaning of the 
statute" (R. 74). 
Upon learning of the claim of Butkovich to this prop-
erty, Coiman filed this action on June 24, 1971, praying 
for a decree quieting title in him based on ownership 
and adverse possession. 
ARGUMENT 
In this case the plaintiff, Coiman, claims to be the 
owner of the fee title to the property in dispute. His 
claim of adverse possession was abandoned at trial be-
cause he didn't have possession (R. 74) and had not paid 
taxes for the required seven years. The defendants 
Butkovich are the owners of a tax title obtained by quit-
claim deed from Summit County, which obtained title 
by Auditor's Tax Deed years earlier. While the validity 
of tax titles are often challenged, the validity of defen-
dants' tax title is not relevant here because the plaintiff 
has the burden to establish his title first before he has 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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standing to challenge defendants' tax title. There are 
two fundamental points which require the reversal of 
the decree quieting title in plaintiff and the dismissal of 
plaintiff's case. These points will be considered first and 
then the arguments establishing defendants' right to have 
the property in dispute quieted in them will follow. 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROP-
ERTY AND THEREFORE NO STANDING 
TO CHALLENGE DEFENDANTS' TITLE. 
A fundamental point of Utah law in cases of this 
kind is that plaintiff can prevail only on the strength 
of his own title and not because of any weakness in the 
title of defendants. Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment 
Company, 29 U. 2d 421, 511 P. 2d 145 (1973); Music 
Service Corporation v. Walton, 20 U. 2d 16, 432 P. 2d 334 
(1967); Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P. 2d 
862 (1939). As to the quality of title which plaintiff 
must establish, this Court stated in the Music Service 
case, supra, at page 336, quoting from the earlier case of 
Cottrell v. Pickering, 32 Utah 62, 88 Pac. 696 (1907): 
" . . . Of course, where one proves a perfect chain 
of paper title from its original source, no proof 
of actual possession at all is required. In such 
event the presumption would be all sufficient and 
the title would be a complete and perfect title. 
But when this is not done, a title prima facie is 
shown by a grant from some one who held posses-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sion, or by such grant and possession under it 
by the grantee . . ." 
These same requirements are set forth in the Babcock 
case, supra. 
In the instant case the plaintiff introduced only the 
deed from Banks to himself. He has no chain of title from 
the patentee, he has admitted that he did not have pos-
session of the property, and he did not attempt to prove 
possession by has grantee, Banks, as required by the 
above cases. Therefore, he has shown no title in himself 
and his complaint should have been dismissed. 
The chain of title, or lack of it, is shown on Exhibit 
No. 11A set forth in the Statement of Facts above. There 
are numerous defects in this chain, all of which should 
be obvious from reading Exhibit No. 11A, but are sum-
marized here: 
1. No conveyance fnom Oliver C. Lockhart 
(44). 
2. The conveyance from William Montague 
Ferry, as guardian of Edward P. Ferry (10), 
at most, could convey a one-fifth beneficial 
interest in the "Park City Townsite," which 
is not the description by which his trustee 
took title. 
3. The Assets Corporation, at most, received a 
one-fifth interest in the "Park City Town-
site," whatever that is (19). 
4. No conveyance from the Assets Corporation. 
5. The Sheriff's Certificate of Sale (12) is in-
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adequate since it does not indicate that the 
property was sold nor does it name a buyer. 
6. The Sheriff's Deed (16) uses a different 
property description than that in the Decree 
of Foreclosure (23). 
7. No conveyance from the Park City Town-
site Company. 
8. Affidavit of Robert T. Banks (38) is not 
competent to establish title since it is hear-
say, self-serving and not the best evidence. 
9. The description of the property in Banks' 
affidavit (38) is inadequate and shows on 
its face that the Assets Corporation was, at 
most, only a part owner of some unidentified 
asserts. 
10. There is no conveyance to Banks. 
All of these defects in the title of plaintiff were ad-
mitted by plaintiff's own expert witness (R. 40-53). The 
plaintiff, however, overlooks all of these defects and relies 
solely on the affidavit of Banks to establish his title. The 
affidavit is, of course, hearsay and was properly objected 
to as such. It is thus inadmissible to establish any of 
the facts which it asserts. The fact that it was recorded 
does not make it admissible. That no effect is to be given 
to such self-serving recitals in recorded documents is 
established by State Road Commission v. Thompson, 17 
U. 2d 412, 413 P. 2d (303 (1966). The facts in that case 
were almost identical to those now before the Court. 
There, the claimant of the fee title received a quit-claim 
deed from Harriet AUenbach. The deed contained a re-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cital that she was the widow of Jacob I. Allenbach, who 
was the record title holder at that time. This Court 
stated: 
"A recital in a deed which would indicate 
that the grantor is an heir or otherwise might 
deraign title from a record owner is merely a 
self-serving dedaration. . . . "The recital is» of 
course, no evidence in favor of anyone daiming 
under the grantor. It is no more competent as 
evidence, as against a stranger to the deed, of 
the facts stated, than it would be if embodied in 
a letter or any other paper'.9' (Quoting 6 Thomp-
son on Real Property, § 3110 (1962 Replace-
ment) (Emphasis added.)) 
In the Thompson case both parties had been paying taxes 
on the property although neither had been in actual pos-
session. The claimant of the legal title had challenged the 
tax title of the other party and the tax title was proved 
to be defective. However, the Court held that since the 
party claiming the legal title had failed to prove its title 
(the hearsay recital in the deed being ineffective), it 
had no standing to challenge the tax title even though 
that tax title was defective. It would appear impossible 
to find a case more dispositive of the issues now before 
this Court. Giving the plaintiff the benefit of every doubt 
and accepting Banks' affidavit at face value, plaintiff 
has not proved his title and has no standing to challenge 
the title of defendants. 
However, the plaintiff's difficulties with Banks' affi-
davit are only beginning. The most serious difficulty is 
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that the assertions in the affidavit are false and it appears 
that he attempted to establish title in himself by fraud. 
Banks was faced with two hurdles to get the property 
into his own name. In the admitted absence of any con-
veyances, he had to get title from Park City Townsite 
Company to Assets Corporation, of which he said he was 
a director and officer, and then to himself. The affidavit 
attempts to assert that since 1916 the Assets Corpora-
tion was the "majority owner of all the property and 
assets of Park City Townsite Company/' and that in 
1920 the President of Assets Corporation, by a resolution 
of Assets Corporation, "was directed to take over the 
affairs of Park City Townsite Company." 
Such phraseology is hardly the epitome of legal pre-
cision. But it is clear in reading the affidavit in a manner 
most favorable to Banks and to plaintiff that the Assets 
Corporation was not the sole owner of the property and 
assets of Park City Townsite Company, and no attempt 
at all is made to show how plaintiff has succeeded to the 
other ownership interests. Moreover, it is difficult to 
understand how the resolution of one corporation to 
"take over the affairs" of another has any effect in ac-
complishing this. 
Even ignoring these rather massive problems, the 
affidavit also asserts 
"That on or about the 19th day of October, 1936, 
at a regular meeting of the directors of said Assets 
Corporation, on motion duly made and passed 
the remaining assets of said Assets Corporation 
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were transferred, assigned and delivered to me 
for the purpose of paying all obligations of said 
corporation and disposing of any remaining 
assets of the corporation and dispursing any and 
all moneys received from sale or disposal of said 
assets to the remaining stockholders of said cor-
poration." 
The problem is that the minutes of that directors' 
meeiting on October 19, 1936, which have been admitted 
in evidence as Exhibit 13, show that Banks' recital of 
what happened is totally false! Rather than show that 
the remaining assets of Assets Corporation were trans-
ferred to Banks for purposes of paying all obligations,, 
disposing of any remaining assets and "dispursing (sic)" 
all moneys received from sale of assets to the remaining 
stockholders, as Banks alleges, the minutes show that the 
secretary was instructed to reinstate the company in 
good standing by payment of delinquent franchise taxes, 
and to redeem certain mining claims from delinquent 
taxes. The president, Mr. Ferry, was authorized to nego-
tiate a loan from the First National Bank of Salt Lake 
City. These are hardly the acts of a company undergo-
ing dissolution. The only reference in those minutes 
vaguely reminiscent of the Bank's affidavit is authoriza-
tion to Mr. Ferry (not Mr. Bank) to "take over the 
affairs of the company with a view to disposing of its 
property." It is not clear from the minutes what company 
is meant by "that company," but even if it were intended 
to be the Park City Townsite Company, such authority 
was clearly not given to Banks. 
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Far from being a corporation which in 1936 had 
authorized Banks to wind up its affairs, the corporation 
in 1940 and 1944 was conveying property, without any 
reference to Banks, and was redeeming claims from de-
linquent taxes as shown by the minutes in Exhibit 14. 
Exhibit 15 is the minutes of a board meeting of the 
Asserts Corporation in 1961, which Banks signed as Sec-
retary. These minutes authorize the sale of certain pat-
ented claims, and report the sale of other claims, the 
proceeds from which were deposited in the corporate bank 
account. Obviously, Banks was far from acting as a trus-
tee to liquidate the corporation. 
Par more serious is a letter from Banks himself writ-
ten shortly prior to the date of his deed to plaintiff, which 
has been admitted in evidence as Exhibit 16 and which 
shows most clearly that Banks himself knew his claim 
to title was improper. 
The letter in its entirety is as follows: 
"Yours of 9-16 and 9-17 with Earnest Money 
Agreement arrived yesterday. The price is O.K. 
and I am enclosing 2 signed copies of the E.M.A. 
"Now — how to get title to this acreage. I 
have gotten the papers from the auditor who is 
still ill, and given them to my son Bill — and 
he will go thru them in the next few days — and 
dig out and give me anything that has any ref-
erence to Park City Townsite — and I'll send 
them to you. 
"When I received all the data on the Assets 
Corp. from the lawyer in Idaho Falls, who had 
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received them from your office afiter Geo. Critch-
low died they included stock book — seal — 
minute book and ledger of the Assets Corp. — but 
nothing of this nature of the Park City Townsite 
Co. What happened to these I don't know, only 
George knew the story. The only thing I know 
of the Townsite Co. are in the minutes of the 
Assets Corp. and contained in the pages I cut 
out of the Minutes Book and mailed to you — 
and from the old ledger which I quoted to you 
in full specifying that the Assets Corp. took over 
the Townsite Co. at an assumed value of $2300 
— That was Dec. 20 -1916. This valuation was 
later raised to $25,000 in August 10th 1922 — 
and that's it unless Bill can dig up something. 
George Critchlow must have had the stock book 
at one time because in the minutes, which I sent 
you, they issued 10 shares each of Townsite stock 
to Bill Ferry and F. Tom Boise — I suppose to 
qualify as directors — or some such purpose -
"I've thought this over and I think we would 
get into a hell of a mess trying to prove Park 
City Townsite Co (given or sold) to Assets Corp. 
(no longer an entity) and the Assets Corp. had 
sold everything left to me for $1.00. 
"Instead lets say I am the Park City Town-
site (anything which is left) which is true. In 
order to do this — lets have, say 100 printed 
letterheads and envelopes, using your Salt Lake 
address and printing my name Robert T. Banks 
Trustee." 
"Then you write a letter to Blanch R. Young 
Treas. Summit Co. and state that the properties 
listed under Park City Townsite Co. W. A. Sny-
der Trustee should be changed to Robert T. 
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Banks Trustee inasmuch as W. A. Snyder has 
been dead for several years. I will sign this letter. 
"Then say we have received the Valuation 
notices of these properties and wish to pay the 
taxes when tax notices are mailed out in Oct this 
year — and the notices should be mailed to 414 
Walker Bank Bldg. 
"If this is O.K. I will then open a checking 
account at Walker Bank under the name of Park 
City Townsite Co., Robert T. Banks Trustee — 
I used to have 2 accounts at the Bank where I 
was well known — under the name Robert T. 
Banks — and Robert T. Banks Mgr. — and bor-
rowed money from them from time to time — 
Then I will pay the taxes from this Townsite 
Acct. 
"This will in no way involve you as I am 
only using your office and you are acting as my 
aitty. 
"If you think it best you could go up to 
Coalville in advance and set things up with the 
Co. Treasurer,, before sending the letter. Let me 
know what you think of this idea — If O.K. then 
I could deed the properties to Coleman under 
my signature as Trustee. 
"I don't want to do anything dishonest and 
if later I get in trouble I can show from records 
the Park City Townsite belonged to Assets Corp. 
— and I bought everything that was left of the 
Assets Corp. when the Corp. was dissolved. 
"But in my opinion it would take a lot of 
time and expense to go that way rather than the 
way I suggest. 
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"I don't think it advisable for you to come 
up here until we see what Bill digs up. 
"I am enclosing 50.00 for a trip to Coalville 
and the stationery — if more say so. 
"I think the price you got is a good one 
and shows the ski activity in and around Paiik 
City. 
"Let me hear from you." 
In suimmary, Banks says, "Now — how to get title 
to this acreage . . . I've thought this over and I think 
we would get into a hell of a mess trying to prove Park 
City Townsiite Co. (given or sold) to Assets Corp. (no 
longer an entity) and the Assets Corp. had sold every-
thing left to me for $1.00. Instead let's say I am the Park 
City Townsite . . ." 
But for some reason Banks changed his mind and 
less than two months later asserted by affidavit as a 
fact an allegation which he acknowledged would get him 
"into a hell of a mess" — that Park City Townsite Com-
pany gave or sold to Assets Corporation, which in turn 
transferred to him. 
Surely a false, self-serving, hearsay affidavit cannot 
establish title, nor even color of title, in plaintiff. This 
Court has held that not even a contract of purchase is 
a written instrument upon which color of title can be 
based. Memmott v. Bosh, U. 2d , 520 P. 2d 1342 
(1974). Plaintiff has no title and, therefore, no standing 
to challenge defendants' title. His relief is in a claim 
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for fraud or on the warranties in his deed against Banks 
for return of his purchase price. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
The statutes of limitations as they apply to this case 
read as follows: 
Section 78-12-5.1 
. . . with respect to actions . . . brought . . . 
for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title 
or determine the ownership of real property 
against the holder of a tax title to such property, 
no such action . . . shall be commenced . . . more 
than four years sifter the date of the tax deed, 
conveyance or transfer creating such tax title 
unless the person commencing . . . such action 
. . . or his predecessor has actually occupied or 
been in possession of such property within four 
years prior to the commencement . . . of such 
action . . . 
Section 78-12-6.2 
No action . . . for the recovery or possession 
of real property or to quiet title or determine the 
ownership thereof shall be commenced . . . 
against the holder of a tax title after the ex-
piration of four years from the date of the sale, 
conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any 
county, or directly to any other purchase (r) 
thereof at any public or private tax sale . . . pro-
vided, however, that this section shall not bar 
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any action . . . by the owner of the legal title to 
such property where he or his predecessor has 
actually occupied or been in actual possession of 
such property within four years from the com-
mencement . . . of such action . . . 
It is established by the evidence that the Defendants 
Butkovich are the holders of a tax title obtained from 
Summit County in July, 1964. The tax title itself was 
created much earlier when the property was conveyed 
to Summit County in 1915 and 1940. This action was 
commenced in June of 1971, more than four years from 
the date of the creation of the tax title. Therefore, under 
provisions of the above statutes, no action can be brought 
unless the Plaintiff Colman has "actually occupied or 
been in actual possession" of the property involved. Thus, 
the only important question is whether or not the Plain-
tiff Colman has satisfied this requirement of actual occu-
pation or possession. 
Mr. Colman stated at the trial that he had not lived 
on the property, nor constructed anything on it, nor put 
up a fence, nor planted anything, nor cultivated it, nor 
plowed it, nor occupied it. His only acts with respect 
to the property, according to his own testimony, were 
to inspect it, to show it to others, to chase away Christ-
mas tree cutters and to place some temporary "no tres-
pass" signs on the property. His attorneys conceded at 
the trial that he did not have possession of the property 
at any time as required by the statutes. 
The only cases which have construed the foregoing 
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statutes have not discussed what constitutes actual occu-
pation or possession, but in each case the party challeng-
ing the tax title had not occupied nor possessed the 
propeorty. Under the cases which consider constructive 
possession of property, the acts of Colman with respect 
to this property would not even constitute constructive 
possession. This is so because the purpose of the statute 
requiring possession is to "bring it home" to the world 
and to any party interested in the property that the party 
in possession is making a claim to that property. The 
case of Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 P. 2d 216 (1947), 
was decided under a claim of adverse possession, as the 
Plaintiff was claiming here but abandoned that claim at 
trial,, although not construing the statutes quoted above 
since those statutes were not passed until later. That 
case held that leveling the property, dumping loads of 
dirt thereon, clearing weeds, storing junk on the property, 
allowing the use of the property for a carnival and plac-
ing a commercial sign on the property was not sufficient 
to constitute adverse possession. Referring to other cases 
where the adverse possession was held sufficient, the 
Court in Day v. Steele said, "the changes were such that 
they would apprise anyone that the land was being used 
in the manner in which the owner would so use it. The 
changes were substantial and of a permanent nature such 
as remained visible for the duration of the statutory 
period and not temporary acts or such as could be mis-
taken for mere occasional trespasses." The acts of owner-
ship in Day v. Steele were certainly more substantial and 
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more permanent than those of Colman with respect to 
the property involved here, and yet those acts wecre held 
insufficient. 
It should be obvious from the above quoted statutes 
and related statutes, however, that more, in the way of 
possession, is required under Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-
12-5.2 than under other statutes. These sections require 
actual occupation and actual possession, which can only 
mean actually residing or conducting a business on the 
property so as to make it obvious to anyone at any point 
in time that the property is owned by someone. This 
requirement of actual occupation is in contrast to the 
requirements of other possession or adverse possession 
statutes. For example, the first sentence of Section 78-
12-5.1, which applies only when no tax title is involved, 
only requires the party to be "seized or possessed" of the 
property. The first sentence of Section 78-12-7.1, which 
also applies only when no tax title is involved, requires 
the property to be "held or possessed adversely." The 
first sentence of Section 78-12-12.1, which applies to a 
party daimdng adverse possession, requires the land to 
be "occupied and claimed". In none of these statutes 
is the word "actual" used in connection with occupation 
or possession and obviously the legislature had a greater 
requirement in mind When it used the word "actual" in 
Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2. The ordinary and usual 
meaning of that word requires residence or conducting 
of a business upon the property claimed. This has not 
been done according to the admission of the plaintiff, 
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and therefore the plain/tiff's Complaint should have been 
dismissed. 
Fiirthermore, Colman did not receive his deed to the 
property until November of 1968. This was more than 
four years after Butkoviches received their tax title in 
July 1964 and, of course, many years after the county 
received its deeds in 1915 and 1940. Colman makes no 
claim of ownership or possession prior to the date of his 
deed and, of course, would have no right to do so. Under 
the case of Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P. 
2d 814 (1957), affd on rehearing, 8 U. 2d 348, 334 P. 2d 
759 (1959), plaintiff has no right to make any claim for 
this property after four years have expired. The Court 
there stated at page 816: 
If read literally and not in context with the en-
tire statute, some of the wording might make it 
appear that one holding a tax title, say, for twen-
ty-five years, who commences an action thereon, 
could be defeated if a defendant having a record 
interest in the property could show that he had 
possession of the property, even for a brief time, 
within the four yeans next prior to the commence-
ment of the action. We believe the legislature 
had in mind a four-year statute of limitations 
barring claims against tax titles, which four-year 
period dated from the initiation of the tax title, 
during which period any claimant against the tax 
title must have had possession of the property 
to protect any claim he might have. Any other 
interpretation does not square with the general 
nature and purpose of the act, and could lead to 
novel and, we believe, unintended results, so as 
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to defeat the entire purpose of a statute that 
seems to be designed to settle, not confuse, and 
to make certain, not uncertain, titles based on 
statutory liquidation of tax charges. 
In Pender v. Alix, 11 Utah 2d 58, 354 P. 2d 1066 
(1960), summary judgment was held "inescapably" proper 
where no possession was shown within four years of the 
issuance of the tax deed by the party attacking the tax 
title. There is no dispute of these facts here. Colman 
did not have any kind of possession, let alone actual pos-
session, within four years from the date of the tax deeds 
to the county in 1915 and 1940 nor within four years 
from the date of the deed to Butkoviches in July, 1964, 
nor at any time for that matter. Dismissal of Colman's 
complaint and judgment for Butkoviches should be "in-
escapable". 
POINT III. 
TITLE TO THE PROPERTY SHOULD BE 
QUIETED IN DEFENDANTS BUTKOVICH. 
The adverse possession statutes as applicable to the 
claim of Defendants Butkovich is as follows: 
Section 78-12-7.1 
. . . if in any action any party shall establish 
prima facie evidence that he is the owner of any 
real property under a tax title held by him and 
his predecessors for four years prior to the com-
mencement of such action and one year after the 
effective date of this amendment he shall be 
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presumed to be the owner of such property by 
adverse possession unless it appears that the 
owner of the legal title or his predecssor has ac-
tually occupied or been in possession of such 
property under such title or that such tax title 
owner and his predecessor have failed to pay all 
the taxes levied or assessed upon such property 
within such four-year period. 
The evidence shows that defendants Butkovich are 
holders of a tax title and have paid the taxes for all years 
since acquiring the tax title. Therefore, Section 78-12-7.1 
presumes the defendants Butkovich to be the owners of 
the property by adverse possession. Unless actual occu-
pation by Colman is shown, the title to the property is 
presumed to be in Butkoviches. As shown under Point 
II above, the admissions of Colman established that he 
did not have actual possession of the property and there 
is no evidence available to overcome the presumption of 
title in Butkoviches. There being no dispute of these 
fa<3te, defendants are therefore entitled to judgment quiet-
ing title in them. 
The position of plaintiff at the trial has been to ig-
nore his own lack of title and only attempt to show some 
weakness in defendants' tax title. Plaintiff overlooks the 
point that the validity of defendants' tax title is irrele-
vant. Section 78-12-5,3, Utah Code Annotated, states: 
The term "tax title" as used in Section 78-
12-5.2 and Section 59-10-65, and the related 
amended Sections 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, 
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means any title to real property, whether valid 
or not, which has been derived through or is de-
pendent upon any sale, conveyance or transfer 
of such property in the course of a statutory 
proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied 
against such property whereby the property is 
relieved from a tax lien. 
The purpose of the legislature in passing these sec-
tions of the Code was to lay to rest any questions as to 
the validity of tax titles after four years. Defendants' 
tax title has been held for more than the required four 
years and, therefore, its validity cannot be challenged. 
Layton v. Holt, 22 Utah 2d 138, 449 P. 2d 986 (1969). 
Fxirtheormore, the claimed problem of identifying the 
land deeded to Butkovich from Summit County, was re-
solved by plaintiff's own expert witness who testified that 
he could locate that description with the refearence in the 
deed to Park City (R. 33-34). It was established that 
the initials "P.C." on the deed is a standard, well-known 
and commonly accepted designation for property in the 
Park City Townsite (R. 90-91). There is no question 
about the location of this property. Both the witnesses 
for plaintiff and defendants testified that they could lo-
cate the property on defendants' tax deed. 
Since the location of the property described on the 
deeds to defendants was not in doubt, the plaintiff's at-
tempt to show a weakness in defendants' title failed. 
Again, the validity of defendants' tax title is not relevant 
since plaintiff failed to show actual possession of the 
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property by him. Title to the property should, therefore, 
have been quieted in defendants. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAIN-
ING THE OBJECTION TO THE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY LOCATING THE PROPERTY 
DESCRIBED ON EXHIBITS 1 AND 2. 
The witnesses for both plaintiff and defendant es-
tablished that the property described on the deeds to 
defendants could be located on the ground and therefore 
the location was not in dispute. However, when the de-
fendants' expert witness was asked his opinion as to the 
location of this property, the court sustained the plain-
tiff's objection on the assumption that "extraneous evi-
dence as to where the property is located" is not admis-
sible (R. 91-94). 
The authority relied upon by the court in refusing 
to admit this evidence was Ferguson v. Mathis, 96 Utah 
442, 85 P. 2d 827 (1938). Far from being authority for 
plaintiff's position, that case held the description of the 
property involved to be sufficient and not misleading and 
relied upon testimony of numerous witnesses that the 
alleged faults in the description were common parlance 
and that there was no other land in the County to which 
the description would apply. Furthermore, this Court 
has recently stated that parol evidence is admissible to 
apply, though not to supply, a description of lands in a 
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contract and that it "may be used for the purpose of iden-
tifying the description contained in the writing with its 
location on the ground." Davison v. Robbins, 30 U. 2d 
338, 517 P. 2d 1026 (1973). 
Defendants made a proffer of proof as to the location 
of this property (R. 94-98) wherein the witness stated 
that the boundaries of this property were well defined 
because of well defined boundaries to the West and North 
and no assessment had been made of the surrounding 
property still owned by the United States. The testimony 
was for the purpose of identifying the description in the 
deed with its location on the ground. There was no other 
property in the county to which this description would 
apply. Therefore, this evidence should have been received 
on the authority of the Ferguson and Davison cases, 
supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the plaintiff has no title himself he has no 
standing to challenge the title of defendants. Even if he 
did have some claim of title, his action against defendants 
is barred by the statutes of limitaitions The statutes 
presume the title to be in the defendants since no actual 
possession has been claimed or proved by plaintiff. The 
question of vagueness or ambiguity in the deeds to de-
fendants should never have been reached by the court 
because plaintiff had no title and no standing to challenge 
defendants' title and because of the bar of the statutes of 
limitations. Yet» the alleged vagueness or ambiguity was 
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removed by testimony from witnesses for both plaintiff 
and defendants and by the proffer of proof which should 
have been received. Therefore, the decree quieting title 
in plaintiff should be reversed and title to the proprty 
in dispute should be quieted in defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorney for Appellant 
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